Controversy
Alrajhi Bank faced allegations in multiple U.S. lawsuits following the attacks on September 11, 2001, including claims that Alrajhi was used to complete financial transactions for people or nonprofit organizations with terrorist ties. Alrajhi-related nonprofit and business ventures located in Virginia were subjected to searches and seizures by U.S. law officials trying to disrupt terrorist financing activities in the U.S. in 2002. In January 2005, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed all claims against the Bank: "Plaintiffs do not offer facts to support their conclusions that Alrajhi Bank had to know that Defendant charities... were supporting... terrorism.... Even accepting all the allegations against Alrajhi Bank as true, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim that would entitle them to relief." Despite these allegations, on June 30, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an order leaving intact the dismissal with prejudice of all claims against the bank, as well as Sulaiman bin Abdulaziz Alrajhi (founder and former chairman) and Abdullah bin Suleiman Alrajhi (chairman and former CEO) among others, related to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The Supreme Court's order brought a final close to claims asserted against the bank and its officers by victims and survivors of 9/11.
In March 2002, as part of Operation Green Quest, a covert U.S. Treasury attempt to disrupt terrorist financing in the U.S., law enforcement agents searched 14 Virginia businesses and nonprofits associated with the SAAR Foundation, a private charitable foundation established in 1983 in which Sulaiman bin Abdulaziz Alrajhi and two other Alrajhi family members were on the initial board of directors. An affidavit stated that over 100 nonprofits and businesses in Virginia were a part of the “Safa Group,” which were believed to be “engaged in the money laundering tactic of ‘layering’ to hide from law enforcement authorities the trail of its support for terrorists.” Subsequent 2006 federal grand jury subpoenas showed Alrajhi Bank was not directly related to the entities subject to the search.
The Alrajhi name was identified in a file that displayed 20 people listed as alleged key financial backers of al Qaeda. The handwritten list, an image of a scanned document on a CD-ROM, was found during a search of the Bosnian offices of the Benevolence International Foundation, a Saudi-based nonprofit later designated a terrorist organization by the Treasury Department. The Golden Chain was discussed in the 9/11 Commission's report, Federal court filings, and civil lawsuits, though the Alrajhi name was not specifically mentioned, while media reports as early as 2004 claimed the list did include the Alrajhi name.
In 2003, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released a classified document entitled, “Al Rajhi Bank: Conduit for Extremist Finance.” According to Glenn Simpson of The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), the CIA report ended with: “Senior Al Rajhi family members have long supported Islamic extremists and probably know that terrorists use their bank.” The 2003 CIA report stated that in 2000, Alrajhi Bank couriers “delivered money to the Indonesian insurgent group Kompak to fund weapons purchases and bomb-making activities.” In 2004, Alrajhi filed a defamation lawsuit against the WSJ for a 2002 article about how Saudi Arabia was monitoring several accounts because of terrorist worries. The lawsuit settled in 2004 and the WSJ was not required to pay damages. The WSJ also published a letter from the bank's chief executive, and its own statement that the newspaper "did not intend to imply an allegation that Al Rajhi Bank supported terrorist activity, or had engaged in the financing of terrorism."
Three of the hijackers in the 9/11 attack, including Abdulaziz al Omari, reportedly used banking services through Alrajhi Bank. Without violating bank secrecy laws, Alrajhi cannot confirm or deny this allegation. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States found that the hijackers had accounts with many banks, including mainstream U.S. banks, but "[c]ontrary to persistent media reports, no financial institution filed a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) in connection with any transaction of any of the 19 hijackers before 9/11...." This, however, “was not unreasonable” in the Commission's view because, “[e]ven in hindsight, there is nothing... to indicate that any SAR should have been filed or the hijackers otherwise reported to law enforcement.”