Empire Avenue

Origins and conception

The concept for Empire Avenue emerged from discussions between its founders—Duleepa Wijayawardhana, Michael Mannion, and Niall Brown—regarding the nature of "value" on the internet, particularly concerning content generated on social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter. They posited that purely algorithmic methods were insufficient to capture this value and envisioned a crowd-sourced market where value could be determined through collective user actions.

The three founders had initially met years earlier while attending Memorial University in St. John's, Newfoundland, Canada. Fifteen years later, having pursued different career paths, they reconnected in Montreal and began developing the idea for Empire Avenue. Their diverse professional backgrounds were also instrumental: Wijayawardhana had experience in the video game industry with BioWare (developer of titles like Mass Effect and Dragon Age) and later with the database company MySQL AB (acquired by Sun Microsystems, then Oracle); Mannion held a Post-Doctorate in Chemistry from Harvard; and Brown had an Arts background. They cited this blend of expertise in gaming, data management, science, and humanities potentially contributed to the platform's multifaceted design, which combined elements of social networking, game mechanics, and data analytics. Wijayawardhana cited the acquisitions of his previous company, MySQL AB, as a factor motivating him to seek a unique entrepreneurial challenge with Empire Avenue. The core vision was to recognize the value created by individuals online and empower these "Influencers" to benefit directly from their content and reach, rather than value accruing solely to large platforms.

Early development and beta phases

Empire Avenue began with a bootstrapping phase, founded by Wijayawardhana, Mannion, and Brown.4 By May 2010, the core team had grown to eight individuals possessing a range of skills including UI/UX design, legal expertise, social media marketing, mathematics, and programming. The company adopted an iterative development strategy, starting with a closed beta test among friends and family to refine the platform. This was followed by an "Invite Beta" phase, allowing controlled growth while actively incorporating community feedback into the development process. A notable event during this early period was the "Big Reset," where all user share prices were reset as the platform transitioned from the closed beta to the invite-only stage.

Even in its beta phase, the platform garnered positive attention, gaining 1,700 users rapidly and briefly trending on Twitter in Canada. By August 2010, while still in beta, Empire Avenue had attracted over 15,000 registered users and businesses from more than 95 countries. Significant virtual economic activity was already occurring, with over 750,000 virtual share trades conducted, representing a total value exceeding half a billion Eaves, the platform's virtual currency.

Public launch and initial growth

Empire Avenue transitioned from its invite-only beta to a public launch around July 28, 2010, with some tech blogs offering early invites shortly before the official opening. At launch, the platform allowed users to connect their accounts from Twitter, Flickr, Facebook, and personal blogs via RSS feeds, using activity on these networks to calculate user share prices. The platform quickly demonstrated international appeal, building on its beta user base from over 95 countries and later reporting users in over 190 countries. Early reports highlighted interest from specific international communities, such as users in Chile.

Funding founds

Empire Avenue secured funding through at least two distinct rounds:

Seed funding: An initial seed investment was raised from a private group of angel investors led by Boris Wertz of W Media Ventures (later Wertz Media Ventures). Announced in August 2010, these funds were earmarked for accelerating site development, launching the planned "Avenue Rewards" program and advertising platform, and funding marketing initiatives to grow the user base.

Series A funding: In August 2011, the company announced it had raised $1.2 million in a funding round led by venture capital firm Crosslink Capital. Significant participation came from iNovia Capital, along with several prominent individual investors, including BioWare co-founders Drs. Ray Muzyka and Greg Zeschuk, Ben Narasin, TriplePoint Capital, former THQ and Take-Two executive Jeff Lapin, Kevin Swan, and Dr. Boris Wertz, who reinvested. The stated purpose of this funding was to expand the team and continue platform development.

Core premise: the Social Stock Market

The fundamental concept behind Empire Avenue was its operation as a "Social Media Exchange" or "influence stock market". Each registered user was assigned a virtual share price, analogous to a stock price for a company. This price was designed to reflect the user's online activity, reach, engagement, and overall influence across various connected social media platforms. The platform used proprietary algorithms to calculate this value, taking into account factors from external networks as well as trading activity within Empire Avenue itself—how frequently a user's shares were bought or sold. The exact formula remained confidential.

A key element of the concept was the idea of a "crowd-sourced market". Rather than relying solely on algorithms, the platform aimed for value to be co-determined by the collective investment decisions of its users. Buying shares in someone signified belief in their current or future influence, adding a human judgment layer to the valuation process. Users were incentivized to increase their own value by encouraging others to invest in them.

Social network integration

Empire Avenue's valuation mechanism was heavily dependent on integrating with external social media platforms. Initially, it connected with Twitter, Flickr, Facebook, and blogs via RSS feeds. Over time, the range of integrated platforms expanded to include YouTube, LinkedIn, Foursquare, and Instagram. The platform analyzed user activity, engagement levels, and network size on these connected services to help determine the user's virtual share price.

A useful feature noted by reviewers was that Empire Avenue provided scores or indicators of activity for each connected network individually. This allowed users to see not just an overall influence score, but also on which specific platforms another user was most active, potentially guiding more effective interaction.

Criticism and controversies

Beyond usability issues, Empire Avenue faced more fundamental criticisms:

"Social pyramid scheme" critique: A prominent critique, notably articulated by Christopher S. Penn in a 2011 blog post, labeled Empire Avenue a "social pyramid scheme game". This argument centered on the platform's virtual economy structure. Penn argued that the primary sources of new Eaves entering the system were limited (initial user allocations, ad engagement, direct purchase) and that significant currency injection relied heavily on recruiting new members who brought in starter cash. Compounding this was the reported 5% "house cut" on all transactions, which constantly removed currency from circulation. The critique suggested that without continuous exponential growth in users (or significant ongoing Eaves purchases), the economy would inevitably contract, making it increasingly difficult for users to profit or even break even (requiring >10% gain on trades to overcome the buy/sell fees). This structure, the argument went, primarily benefited early adopters or those adept at recruitment, mirroring pyramid scheme dynamics, while potentially exploiting users' desire for social validation through metrics. This line of criticism attacked the core economic engine of the platform, questioning its long-term sustainability and ethical foundation, representing a more profound challenge than critiques focused merely on features or usability.

Economic model sustainability: Related to the pyramid scheme critique were broader questions about the long-term viability of the Eaves economy, given its reliance on new user influx or direct currency purchases to counteract the deflationary pressure of the transaction fees.

Brand engagement challenges: As noted earlier, analysts pointed out several hurdles for brands using the platform. These included the difficulty in demonstrating clear ROI in terms of sales or cost reduction, the potential for users to "game the system" rather than engage authentically, uncertainty about why consumers would invest in brand shares (affinity vs. speculation), and a lack of robust features for brands to directly reward their virtual shareholders beyond potential share price increases.