The story
Origins and creation (2003)
SASAC was created in 2003 as part of a State Council restructuring that sought to clarify state ownership of major enterprises and separate government administration from enterprise management. The new body was placed directly under the State Council to exercise the state's contributor and shareholder rights in centrally administered, non-financial state-owned enterprises. Its mandate was framed the same year by the State Council's Interim Regulations on the Supervision and Management of State-Owned Assets of Enterprises, which set out the goals of preserving and increasing state capital value and excluded financial institutions from the remit. In early public briefings the first SASAC leadership described a toolkit that included executive appointments and evaluation, approval of major reorganisations, dispatch of supervisory boards to key firms, and drafting of rules on the management of state assets.
Early oversight model (2003 to 2012)
In the years after its creation SASAC put in place executive performance contracts and an appraisal system for central SOE leaders. Provisional appraisal procedures were issued in late 2003 and by October 2004 the commission reported that most central SOEs had signed responsibility contracts setting financial and governance targets for annual and term evaluation.
Board reform followed. From 2004 SASAC piloted boards of directors and strengthened the role of outside directors to improve monitoring and decision-making at group level. Seven central government-owned SOEs were chosen for the pilot program, which added boards of directors at the company level, with at least two external board members selected by SASAC. Supervisory boards dispatched on behalf of the State Council reviewed key enterprises and reported on performance and risk alongside SASAC's appraisal work. The legal base was consolidated with the 2008 law on state-owned assets in enterprises, which codified the state owner system and the division of central and local contributor functions. During this period fiscal arrangements for state-capital income were clarified. The state capital operating budget was administered through the Ministry of Finance, while SASAC continued to develop owner-oversight tools around appointments, boards and performance contracts.
Reform acceleration (2013 to 2016)
The Party’s Third Plenum in 2013 set out plans to develop mixed ownership and to shift from managing enterprises toward managing state capital. In 2015 the Guiding Opinions on Deepening State-owned Enterprise Reform provided the main blueprint and a "1+N" package of supporting documents. Policies classified SOEs into commercial and public-welfare categories with differentiated appraisal, and affirmed Party leadership inside corporate governance. SASAC and the State Council also launched pilots for state-capital investment and state-capital operation companies that would manage portfolios of state equity at arm's length from operating firms. In early 2016 China Chengtong and China Reform Holdings were named as the first central state-capital operation platforms. Restructuring accelerated. Notable mergers included CSR and CNR to form CRRC in 2015, COSCO Shipping in 2016, and the creation of China Baowu through the combination of Baosteel and Wuhan Iron & Steel in 2016.
State-capital management shift (2017 to 2020)
From 2017 policy moved further toward managing capital. SASAC updated supervision rules for investment by central enterprises and issued dedicated measures for overseas investment that introduced a negative list, main-business requirements and whole-life-cycle oversight. The National Development and Reform Commission revised outbound investment procedures for all firms the same year. Portfolio consolidation continued with the 2017 merger of Shenhua Group and Guodian Group to form China Energy Investment and the 2019 expansion of Baowu through a controlling stake in Magang Group. Governance pilots also widened. The Double Hundred Action selected central and local SOE subsidiaries to trial market-oriented incentives, board practices and mixed-ownership mechanisms. Balance-sheet discipline became a priority. SASAC set multi-year targets to lower the average asset-liability ratio of central SOEs and reported that goals for the 2018 to 2020 period had been met by the end of 2020. In parallel the State Council launched transfers of 10% of state equity in qualified SOEs to the National Social Security Fund to support pensions and diversify state shareholding.
Reform deepening and enhancement action (2023–2025)
In July 2023, Vice Premier Zhang Guoqing addressed a national teleconference launching a campaign to "deepen and upgrade" SOE reform, which state media described as oriented toward serving national strategies and strengthening SOEs' core functions and competitiveness. Related reporting highlighted priorities including improvements to performance assessment, optimisation of the state-owned economy's structure, capital-focused oversight, and strengthened Party leadership within SOEs.
In June 2025, Xinhua reported that SASAC said at a thematic meeting that, by the end of the first quarter of 2025, the average completion rate of key reform tasks under the campaign had exceeded 80%, and described 2025 as the concluding year for the reform programme.
In December 2025, Xinhua reported that a central enterprise leaders' meeting was told that the campaign's main tasks were "basically completed", and cited examples including continued strategic reorganisations and specialised integration as well as steps to strengthen governance and supervision systems.
From Wikipedia’s article on State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, shared under CC BY-SA 4.0.4
