The story
History
Private passenger service
In 1916, 98% of all commercial intercity travelers in the United States moved by rail, and the remaining 2% moved by inland waterways. Nearly 42 million passengers used railways as primary transportation. Passenger trains were owned and operated by the same privately owned companies that operated freight trains. As the 20th century progressed, patronage declined in the face of competition from buses, air travel, and the car. New streamlined diesel-powered trains, such as the Pioneer Zephyr, were popular with the traveling public but could not reverse the trend. By 1940, railroads held 67 percent of commercial passenger-miles in the United States. In real terms, passenger-miles had fallen by 40% since 1916, from 42 billion to 25 billion.
Traffic surged during World War II, aided by troop movement and gasoline rationing. The railroad's market share surged to 74% in 1945, with a massive 94 billion passenger-miles. After the war, railroads rejuvenated their overworked and neglected passenger fleets with fast and luxurious streamliners. These new trains brought only temporary relief to the overall decline. Even as postwar travel exploded, passenger travel percentages of the overall market share fell to 46% by 1950, and then 32% by 1957. The railroads had lost money on passenger service since the Great Depression, but deficits reached $723 million in 1957. For many railroads, these losses threatened financial viability.
The causes of this decline were heavily debated. The National Highway System and airports, both funded by the government, competed directly with the railroads, which, unlike the airline, bus, and trucking companies, paid for their own infrastructure. American car culture was also on the rise in the post–World War II years. Progressive Era rate regulation limited the railroads' ability to turn a profit. Railroads also faced antiquated work rules and inflexible relationships with trade unions. To take one example, workers continued to receive a day's pay for 100-to-150-mile (160 to 240 km) workdays. Streamliners covered that in two hours.
Matters approached a crisis in the 1960s. Passenger service route-miles fell from 107,000 miles (172,000 km) in 1958 to 49,000 miles (79,000 km) in 1970, the last full year of private operation. The diversion of most United States Post Office Department mail from passenger trains to trucks, airplanes, and freight trains in late 1967 deprived those trains of badly needed revenue. In direct response, the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway filed to discontinue 33 of its remaining 39 trains, ending almost all passenger service on one of the largest railroads in the country. The equipment the railroads had ordered after World War II was now 20 years old, worn out, and in need of replacement.
Formation
As passenger service declined, various proposals were brought forward to rescue it. The 1961 Doyle Report proposed that the private railroads pool their services into a single body. Similar proposals were made in 1965 and 1968 but failed to attract support. The federal government passed the High Speed Ground Transportation Act of 1965 to fund pilot programs in the Northeast Corridor, but this did nothing to address passenger deficits. In late 1969, multiple proposals emerged in the United States Congress, including equipment subsidies, route subsidies, and, lastly, a "quasi-public corporation" to take over the operation of intercity passenger trains. Matters were brought to a head on June 21, 1970, when the Penn Central, the largest railroad in the Northeastern United States and teetering on bankruptcy, filed to discontinue 34 of its passenger trains.
In October 1970, Congress passed, and President Richard Nixon signed into law (against the objections of most of his advisors), the Rail Passenger Service Act. Proponents of the bill, led by the National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP), sought government funding to ensure the continuation of passenger trains. They conceived the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (NRPC), a quasi-public corporation that would be managed as a for-profit organization, but which would receive taxpayer funding and assume operation of intercity passenger trains – while many involved in drafting the bill did not believe the NRPC would actually be profitable, this was necessary in order for the White House and more conservative members of Congress to support the bill.
There were several key provisions:
Any railroad operating intercity passenger service could contract with the NRPC, thereby joining the national system.
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The United States federal government, through the Secretary of Transportation, would own all of the NRPC's issued and outstanding preferred stock.
Participating railroads bought into the NRPC using a formula based on their recent intercity passenger losses. The purchase price could be satisfied either by cash or rolling stock; in exchange, the railroads received NRPC common stock.
Any participating railroad was freed of the obligation to operate intercity passenger service after May 1, 1971, except for those services chosen by the Department of Transportation (DOT) as part of a "basic system" of service and paid for by NRPC using its federal funds.
Railroads that chose not to join the NRPC system were required to continue operating their existing passenger service until 1975, at which time they could pursue the customary Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) approval process for any discontinuance or alteration to the service.
Of the 26 railroads still offering intercity passenger service in 1970, only six declined to join the NRPC.
Nearly everyone involved expected the experiment to be short-lived. The Nixon administration and many Washington insiders viewed the NRPC as a politically expedient way for the President and Congress to give passenger trains a "last hurrah" as demanded by the public. They expected the NRPC to quietly disappear as public interest waned. After Fortune magazine exposed the manufactured mismanagement in 1974, Louis W. Menk, chairman of the Burlington Northern Railroad, remarked that the story was undermining the scheme to dismantle Amtrak. Proponents also hoped that government intervention would be brief and that Amtrak would soon be able to support itself. Neither view had proved to be correct; popular support allowed Amtrak to continue in operation longer than critics imagined, while financial results made passenger train service returning to private railroad operations infeasible.
Selection of initial routes
The Rail Passenger Service Act gave the Secretary of Transportation, at that time John A. Volpe, thirty days to produce an initial draft of the endpoints of the routes the NRPC would be required by law to serve for four years. On November 24 Volpe presented his initial draft consisting of 27 routes to Nixon, which he believed would make a $24-million profit by 1975. The Office of Management and Budget believed Volpe and the DOT's analysis was far too optimistic, with director George Shultz arguing to cut the number of routes by around half. Nixon agreed with Shultz, and the public draft presented by Volpe on November 30 consisted of only 16 routes.
The initial reaction to this heavily-cut-back proposed system from the public, the press, and congressmen was strongly negative. It made front-page headlines across the country and it was quickly leaked that the DOT had wanted a far larger system than the White House would approve. The ICC produced its own report on December 29, criticising the proposed draft and arguing for the inclusion of 15 additional routes, giving further ammunition to the congressmen who wanted an expanded system. Further wrangling between the DOT and the White House produced the final list of routes on January 28, 1971, adding 5 additional routes to the November 30 draft.
These required routes had only their endpoints specified; the selection of the actual routes to be taken between the endpoints was left to the NRPC, which had just three months to decide them before it was due to start service. Consultants from McKinsey & Company were hired to perform this task, and their results were publicly announced on March 22.
At the same time, the NRPC had hired Lippincott & Margulies to create a brand for it and replace its original working brand name of Railpax. On March 30, L&M's work was presented to the NRPC's board of incorporators, who unanimously agreed on the "headless arrow" logo and on the new brand name "Amtrak", a portmanteau of the words America and trak, the latter itself a sensational spelling of track. The name change was publicly announced less than two weeks before operations began.
1970s: The Rainbow Era
Amtrak began operations on May 1, 1971. Amtrak received no rail tracks or rights-of-way at its inception. All of Amtrak's routes were continuations of prior service, although Amtrak pruned about half the passenger rail network. Of the 366 train routes that operated previously, Amtrak continued only 184. Several major corridors became freight-only, including the ex-New York Central Railroad's Water Level Route from New York to Ohio and Grand Trunk Western Railroad's Chicago to Detroit route. The reduced passenger-train schedules created confusion amongst staff. At some stations, Amtrak service was available only late at night or early in the morning, prompting complaints from passengers. Disputes with freight railroads over track usage caused some services to be rerouted, temporarily cancelled, or replaced with buses. On the other hand, the creation of the Los Angeles–Seattle Coast Starlight from three formerly separate train routes was an immediate success, resulting in an increase to daily service by 1973.
Needing to operate only half the train routes that had operated previously, Amtrak would lease around 1,200 of the best passenger cars from the 3,000 that the private railroads owned. All were air-conditioned, and 90% were easy-to-maintain stainless steel. When Amtrak took over, passenger cars and locomotives initially retained the paint schemes and logos of their former owners which resulted in Amtrak's running trains with mismatched colors – the "Rainbow Era". In mid-1971, Amtrak began purchasing some of the equipment it had leased, including 286 EMD E and F unit diesel locomotives, 30 GG1 electric locomotives and 1,290 passenger cars. By 1975, the official Amtrak color scheme was painted on most Amtrak equipment and newly purchased locomotives and the rolling stock began appearing.
Amtrak inherited problems with train stations (most notably deferred maintenance) and redundant facilities from the competing railroads that once served the same communities. Chicago is a prime example; on the day prior to Amtrak's inception, intercity passenger trains used five different Chicago terminals: LaSalle, Dearborn, North Western Station, Central, and Union. The trains at LaSalle remained there, as their operator Rock Island could not afford to opt into Amtrak. Of all the trains serving Dearborn Station, Amtrak retained only a pair of Santa Fe trains, which relocated to Union Station beginning with the first Amtrak departures on May 1, 1971. Dearborn Station closed after the last pre-Amtrak trains on the Santa Fe arrived in Chicago on May 2. None of the intercity trains that had served North Western Station became part of the Amtrak system, and that terminal became commuter-only after May 1. The trains serving Central Station continued to use that station until an alternate routing was adopted in March 1972. In New York City, Amtrak had to maintain two stations (Penn and Grand Central) due to the lack of track connections to bring trains from upstate New York into Penn Station; a problem that was rectified once the Empire Connection was built in 1991. The Amtrak Standard Stations Program was launched in 1978 and proposed to build a standardized station design across the system with an aim to reduce costs, speed construction, and improve its corporate image. However, the cash-strapped railroad would ultimately build relatively few of these standard stations.
Amtrak soon had the opportunity to acquire rights-of-way. Following the bankruptcy of several northeastern railroads in the early 1970s, including Penn Central, which owned and operated the Northeast Corridor (NEC), Congress passed the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976. A large part of the legislation was directed to the creation of Conrail, but the law also enabled the transfer of the portions of the NEC not already owned by state authorities to Amtrak. Amtrak acquired the majority of the NEC on April 1, 1976. (The portion in Massachusetts is owned by the Commonwealth and managed by Amtrak. The route from New Haven to New Rochelle is owned by New York's Metropolitan Transportation Authority and the Connecticut Department of Transportation as the New Haven Line.) This mainline became Amtrak's "jewel" asset, and helped the railroad generate revenue. While the NEC ridership and revenues were higher than those of any other segment of the system, the cost of operating and maintaining the corridor proved to be overwhelming. As a result, Amtrak's federal subsidy was increased dramatically. In subsequent years, other short-route segments not needed for freight operations were transferred to Amtrak.
In its first decade, Amtrak fell far short of financial independence, a shortage that continues today, but it did find modest success rebuilding trade. Outside factors discouraged competing transport, such as fuel shortages which increased costs of automobile and airline travel, and strikes which disrupted airline operations. Investments in Amtrak's track, equipment and information also made Amtrak more relevant to America's transportation needs. Amtrak's ridership increased from 16.6 million in 1972 to 21 million in 1981.
In February 1978, Amtrak moved its headquarters to 400 North Capitol Street NW, Washington, D.C.
1980s and 1990s: The Building Era
In 1982, former Secretary of the Navy and retired Southern Railway head William Graham Claytor Jr. came out of retirement to lead Amtrak. During his time at Southern, Claytor was a vocal critic of Amtrak's prior managers, who all came from non-railroading backgrounds. Transportation Secretary Drew Lewis cited this criticism as a reason that the Democrat Claytor was acceptable to the Reagan White House. Despite frequent clashes with the Reagan administration over funding, Claytor enjoyed a good relationship with Lewis, John H. Riley, the head of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), and with members of Congress. Limited funding led Claytor to use short-term debt to fund operations.
Building on mechanical developments in the 1970s, high-speed Washington–New York Metroliner Service was improved with new equipment and faster schedules. Travel time between New York and Washington, D.C., was reduced to under 3 hours due to system improvements and limited stop service. This improvement was cited as a reason that Amtrak grew its share of intercity trips between the cities along the corridor. Elsewhere in the country, demand for passenger rail service resulted in the creation of five new state-supported routes in California, Illinois, Missouri, Oregon and Pennsylvania, for a total of 15 state-supported routes.
Amtrak added two trains in 1983, the California Zephyr between Oakland and Chicago via Denver and revived the Auto Train, a unique service that carries both passengers and their vehicles. Amtrak advertised it as a great way to avoid traffic along the I-95 running between Lorton, Virginia, (near Washington, D.C.) and Sanford, Florida, (near Orlando) on the Silver Star alignment.
In 1980s and 1990s, stations in Baltimore, Chicago, and Washington, D.C., received major rehabilitation and the Empire Connection tunnel opened in 1991, allowing Amtrak to consolidate all New York services at Penn Station. Despite the improvements, Amtrak's ridership stagnated at roughly 20 million passengers per year, amid uncertain government aid from 1981 to about 2000.
In the early 1990s, Amtrak tested several different high-speed trains from Europe on the Northeast Corridor. An X 2000 train was leased from Sweden for test runs from October 1992 to January 1993, followed by revenue service between Washington, D.C., and New York City from February to May and August to September 1993. Siemens showed the ICE 1 train from Germany, organizing the ICE Train North America Tour which started to operate on the Northeast Corridor on July 3, 1993.
In 1993, Thomas Downs succeeded Claytor as Amtrak's fifth president. The stated goal remained "operational self-sufficiency". By this time, however, Amtrak had a large overhang of debt from years of underfunding. In the mid-1990s, Amtrak suffered through a serious cash crunch. Under Downs, Congress included a provision in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 that resulted in Amtrak's receiving a $2.3 billion tax refund that resolved their cash crisis. However, Congress also instituted a "glide path" to financial self-sufficiency, excluding railroad retirement tax act payments.
George Warrington became the sixth president in 1998, with a mandate to make Amtrak financially self-sufficient. Under Warrington, the company tried to expand into express freight shipping, placing Amtrak in competition with the "host" freight railroads and the trucking industry.
On March 9, 1999, Amtrak unveiled its plan for the Acela Express, a high-speed train on the Northeast Corridor between Washington, D.C., and Boston. Several changes were made to the corridor to make it suitable for higher-speed electric trains. The Northend Electrification Project extended existing electrification from New Haven, Connecticut, to Boston to complete the overhead power supply along the 454-mile (731 km) route, and several grade crossings were improved or removed.
2000s: Growth in the 21st century
Ridership increased during the first decade of the 21st century after the implementation of capital improvements in the NEC and rises in automobile fuel costs. The inauguration of the high-speed Acela in late 2000 generated considerable publicity and led to major ridership gains. However, through the late 1990s and very early 21st century, Amtrak could not add sufficient express freight revenue or cut sufficient other expenditures to break even. By 2002, it was clear that Amtrak could not achieve self-sufficiency, but Congress continued to authorize funding and released Amtrak from the requirement. In early 2002, David L. Gunn replaced Warrington as seventh president. In a departure from his predecessors' promises to make Amtrak self-sufficient in the short term, Gunn argued that no form of passenger transportation in the United States is self-sufficient as the economy is currently structured. Highways, airports, and air traffic control all require large government expenditures to build and operate, coming from the Highway Trust Fund and Aviation Trust Fund paid for by user fees, highway fuel and road taxes, and, in the case of the General Fund, from general taxation. Gunn dropped most freight express business and worked to eliminate deferred maintenance.
Funding history
1970s to 1990s
Amtrak commenced operations in 1971 with $40 million in direct federal aid, $100 million in federally insured loans, and a somewhat larger private contribution. Officials expected that Amtrak would break even by 1974, but those expectations proved unrealistic and annual direct federal aid reached a 17-year high in 1981 of $1.25 billion. During the Reagan administration, appropriations were halved and by 1986, federal support fell to a decade low of $601 million, almost none of which were capital appropriations. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Congress continued the reductionist trend even while Amtrak expenses held steady or rose. Amtrak was forced to borrow to meet short-term operating needs, and by 1995 Amtrak was on the brink of a cash crisis and was unable to continue to service its debts. In response, in 1997 Congress authorized $5.2 billion for Amtrak over the next five years – largely to complete the Acela capital project – on the condition that Amtrak submit to the ultimatum of self-sufficiency by 2003 or liquidation. While Amtrak made financial improvements during this period, it did not achieve self-sufficiency.
2000s
In 2004, a stalemate in federal support of Amtrak forced cutbacks in services and routes as well as the resumption of deferred maintenance. In fiscal 2004 and 2005, Congress appropriated about $1.2 billion for Amtrak, $300 million more than President George W. Bush had requested. However, the company's board requested $1.8 billion through fiscal 2006, the majority of which (about $1.3 billion) would be used to bring infrastructure, rolling stock, and motive power back to a state of good repair. In Congressional testimony, the DOT Inspector General confirmed that Amtrak would need at least $1.4 billion to $1.5 billion in fiscal 2006 and $2 billion in fiscal 2007 just to maintain the status quo. In 2006, Amtrak received just under $1.4 billion, with the condition that Amtrak would reduce (but not eliminate) food and sleeper service losses. Thus, dining service was simplified and now requires two fewer on-board service workers. Only Auto Train and Empire Builder services continue regular made-on-board meal service. In 2010 the Senate approved a bill to provide $1.96 billion to Amtrak, but cut the approval for high-speed rail to a $1 billion appropriation.
State governments have partially filled the breach left by reductions in federal aid. Several states have entered into operating partnerships with Amtrak, notably California, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Michigan, Oregon, Missouri, Washington, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, Wisconsin, Vermont, Maine, and New York, as well as the Canadian province of British Columbia, which provides some of the resources for the operation of the Cascades route.
With the dramatic rise in gasoline prices during 2007–08, Amtrak saw record ridership. Capping a steady five-year increase in ridership overall, regional lines saw 12% year-over-year growth in May 2008. In October 2007, the Senate passed S. 294, the Passenger Rail Improvement and Investment Act of 2007 (70–22), sponsored by Senators Frank Lautenberg and Trent Lott. Despite a veto threat by President Bush, a similar bill passed the House on June 11, 2008, with a veto-proof margin (311–104). The final bill, spurred on by the September 12 Metrolink collision in California and retitled Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, was signed into law by President Bush on October 16, 2008. The bill appropriates $2.6 billion a year in Amtrak funding through 2013.
2010s
Amtrak points out that in 2010, its farebox recovery (percentage of operating costs covered by revenues generated by passenger fares) was 79%, the highest reported for any U.S. passenger railroad. This increased to 94.9% in 2018. In 2019, which was Amtrak's best year in farebox recovery, Amtrak was short by only $29.4 million from breaking even for that year.
Amtrak has argued that it needs to increase capital program costs in 2013 in order to replace old train equipment because the multi-year maintenance costs for those trains exceed what it would cost to simply buy new equipment that would not need to be repaired for several years. However, despite an initial request for more than $2.1 billion in funding for the year, the company had to deal with a year-over-year cut in 2013 federal appropriations, dropping to under $1.4 billion for the first time in several years. Amtrak stated in 2010 that the backlog of needed repairs of the track it owns on the Northeast Corridor included over 200 bridges, most dating to the 19th century, tunnels under Baltimore dating to the American Civil War era and functionally obsolete track switches which would cost $5.2 billion to repair (more than triple Amtrak's total annual budget). Amtrak's budget is allocated on only a yearly basis, and it has been argued by Joseph Vranich that this makes multi-year development programs and long-term fiscal planning difficult if not impossible.
In Fiscal Year 2011, the U.S. Congress granted Amtrak $563 million for operating and $922 million for capital programs.
2020s
In 2021, the 117th United States Congress passed and President Joe Biden signed the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, which directly appropriated $66 billion for rail over a five-year period, of which at least $18 billion is designated for expanding passenger rail service to new corridors, and it authorized an additional $36 billion. Amtrak received $22 billion in advance appropriations and $19 billion in fully authorized funds.
From Wikipedia’s article on Amtrak, shared under CC BY-SA 4.0.5
